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El gobierno de coalición del Primer Ministro Giuseppe Conte nació después de las elec-
ciones parlamentarias de marzo de 2018, como resultado, no de la proximidad ideoló-
gica, sino de una elección racional, un intercambio estratégico entre las dos partes. La 
derechista Lega aceptó cierto aumento del gasto público solicitado por su socio popu-
lista, y el movimiento Cinque Stelle aceptó algunos límites a los flujos migratorios pro-
movidos por su socio xenófobo. El  sistema político italiano, que desde la década de 1990 
se había caracterizado por un pluripartitismo moderado y una competencia centrípeta, 
sufrió un impulso hacia la radicalización. El experimento terminó en el verano de 2019 
y se formó un gobierno dominante entre la izquierda moderada (Partido Democrático) 
y la radical (Movimento de Cinque Stelle).
Resumen
Palabras clave Polarización, Populismo, Sistema Político Italiano.
Abstract The coalition government of Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte was born after the parlia-
mentary elections of March 2018 as an outcome not of ideological proximity, but of ra-
tional choice, a strategic exchange between the two parties. The rightist League accepted 
some increase of the public expenditure requested by its populist partner, and the 5 Star 
movement accepted some limits to immigration flows, promoted by its xenophobic part-
ner. The Italian political system, which since the 1990’s had been characterized by mode-
rate pluri-partitism and a centripetal competition, after 2018 has suffered a push towards 
radicalization. The experiment ended in the summer of 2019, when League decided to 
break the previous contract with 5 Star Movement, and a mainstream government be-
tween moderate (Democratic Party) and radical (5 Star Movement) left was formed.
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Introduction Electoral growth and the rise to power of radical and/or populist parties and leaders 
(characterized by opposition to the current political system) in several Latin American 
and European countries, has led to the study of these phenomena and to the introduc-
tion of some key interpretations of the political change that has also swept through even 
European democracies. These political changes, with different goals, are interrelated, 
if we consider that, in addition to the electoral choice and the functioning of the par-
liament, the party systems influence governments’ behaviors. These changes have also 
affected the Italian political system, the study of which is the focus of this article. The 
main research questions of the empirical analysis are the following: 
 ♦ Is the system of moderate, multi-party and centripetal competition (of the Italian 
political system in recent decades) now destined to give way to a structure subjected 
to political radicalization? 
 ♦ Which effect did radical positions have at the beginning, middle, and fall of the re-
cent 5SM-League coalition government? 
 ♦ How can we explain the birth of this government, as well its end? 
The study presents two hypothesis, which are closely related. First: the 5SM and the Lea-
gue are political parties that occupy the extreme positions on the right/left axis, remai-
ning democratic actors, of course. They are both radical political forces: one on the right, 
the other one on the left of the political spectrum. Starting from this first hypothesis, it 
follows that the political system has shown a radicalization. The 2018 election competi-
tion was centrifugal. The governmental alliance was the outcome of that radicalization. 
This article addresses these different research questions: after the introduction, the se-
cond paragraph discusses the analytical approach, focusing on political preferences and 
ideologies. The third part carries out a survey of the studies on populism, starting from 
the different conceptual categories. The analytical approach is the basis of the empirical 
research on the Italian case, exposed in the fourth and fifth part. Finally, the last section 
shows the conclusions of this inquiry.
The political 
culture of the 
radical (populist) 
left and the radical 
(xenophobic) right
In order to study the phenomenon of radicalization, it is important to summarize the 
classification of democratic political cultures put forth by Fossati (2017), who has identi-
fied the features of left-wing radicalism (populism) and right-wing radicalism (xenophobia). 
Political cultures may be defined as coherent sets of ideas (or ideologies) and interests 
(Fossati 2017). The author has identified four models of political cultures in contempo-
rary Western democracies: the conservative, the liberal, the social democrat (constructivist), 
and the socialist (Manichean).
Rightist conservatism has focused on the defense of two main interests: the defense of 
security of its citizens and the application of moderate laissez faire economic institutions. 
Conservators have always been in favor of capitalism, but they tried to defend national 
producers (with moderate trade and investments’ protectionism) and to oppose blind 
privatizations, that would increase investments of foreign firms. Security has been 
applied both to the fight against criminal individuals/organizations and to the limits to 
foreign immigration flow. In sum, in conservatism, interests are more relevant, and sub-
sequently favor the consolidation of a nationalist ideology.  
Liberal parties have always focused on the defense of values, such as human rights, 
democracy, free market, and national self determination. Liberals promoted both civil 
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and political rights in Western democracies, and have supported the free movements of 
goods and people. They have always promoted a symmetric integration of immigrants 
that must respect the laws of the guest country; then, foreign countries should apply 
reciprocity to the legislation on immigrants coming from the West. In economy, liberals 
have promoted radical laissez faire reforms, by supporting privatizations and foreign in-
vestments. Liberals have also promoted cultural pluralism, being in favor of federalism, 
and/or secessions, if some minorities with different cultural identities promote natio-
nal self-determination through referenda. Liberals have been in favor of single-nations 
states, as cultural pluralism is preferred to state interests. In sum, liberalism start with 
the defense of some values (democracy, radical laissez faire, federalism), and then conso-
lidates the interests of actors like business groups or pro-human rights NGOs.
The leftist moderate political culture has consolidated constructivist values. These have 
been the strategies of social-democrat parties: they have always promoted solidarity 
among classes, to be defended through the welfare state. After 1989, the main value of 
moderate left has become multiculturalism. It has been applied to decisions concerning 
both Third World migration flows towards the West, and armed conflict resolution pro-
cesses outside the West. Constructivists have promoted free immigration flows, throu-
gh an ‘asymmetric’ integration process with immigrants, who are not asked to respect 
the laws of the guest country; then, reciprocity is not asked to foreign governments 
when they must defend the rights of Western immigrants in the Third World. Then, 
multiculturalism has been applied to conflict resolution processes, by neglecting na-
tional self-determination and referenda outside the West, and by promoting pluri-na-
tional states, based more on consensus pacts than on federalism. The ideology of the 
moderate left has also been called ‘political correctness’. In economy, the constructivist 
left has accepted free market, even if it should be corrected by a strong state governance: 
welfare state in domestic politics and foreign aid in world politics. Thus, this political 
culture also starts from values (solidarity though welfare state and politically correct 
multiculturalism) and then consolidates interests: of unions, of NGOs on migrations or 
foreign aid. 
The leftist neo-Marxist philosophy (without the violent inclination of communism), ba-
sed on third-worldism and passive non-violence, has led to a Manichean ideology (Fossati 
2017). Pre-1989 Manicheanism has consolidated a ‘socialist’ political culture, whose par-
ties were in favor of democracy (instead of violent communists), but against capitalism 
and wanted to nationalize the private property. These objectives have never been rea-
ched within Western democracies, and if socialist parties won the elections, they turned 
into social-democrats. Only communist regimes have applied fully socialist institutions, 
but after the crisis of both institutions in 1989, and especially after the 2008 economic 
crisis, that void was filled by populism. In Latin America, populism was applied after 
the 1929 economic crisis and the Second World War. Democratic governments (like Pe-
ron in Argentina or Allende in Chile) partially applied socialism (in the energy or in the 
agriculture sector) during the Cold War, and coupled it with trade protectionism and 
populism, that was based both on a strong expansion of public expenditure and money 
supply, and deep redistributive policies, that had a very negative economic impact. 
After 1989, two other hybrid political cultures materialized. Neo-communism promoted 
a post-modern synthesis between non-violent socialism and revolutionary communism. 
In fact, neo-communists are not directly violent, but appreciate the violence of the others 
(the underdogs): Castro, Chavez, Chiapas rebels. Neo-communism has been stronger 
in the Cold War but persisted in the 1990’s, but then declined. Another hybrid, between 
conservatism and Nazi-Fascism, has recently materialized in the West: the xenophobic 
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radical right. This ideology is deeply against political correctness and foreign immigra-
tion flows, especially from Islamic countries. Xenophobic parties are not directly vio-
lent, but their discourse is very ambiguous and deeply intolerant, and the application of 
their values may lead to the violence of the others, which is never criticized. Labeling the 
right as nationalistic or sovereignist is not enough, as these values are shared with con-
servative parties. However, these two hybrid political cultures are still within the limits 
of Western democratic values, even if at the very edge.
In sum, according to Fossati (2020), populism is not above the left-right cleavage, and 
only concerns radical leftist parties. Populism must have both economic (the increase of 
public expenditure) and political dimension: the so-called plebiscitarianism. This dimen-
sion is the direct relation between leader and masses. In fact, several rightist (liberal, 
conservative or xenophobic) parties and leader, that are usually labeled as populist, have 
never promoted the increase of the public expenditure, even if they are plebiscitarian. 
This research considers the possibility of placing M5S populism on the extreme left, and 
Salvini’s League on the extreme right of the political spectrum. This first hypothesis (see 
the Introduction) will be tested through the policies of the government, which came to 
power in June 2018 and was presided over by Giuseppe Conte.  




Populism has been studied from different perspectives and, according to Chiapponi 
(2014), there are basically three ways in which scholars have tried to reconstruct me-
aning and empirical evidence of the phenomenon. The first goal was to study populism 
as a political regime, then as a set of symbolic elements and, the third, looked at populism as 
a specific communicative style. Studying populism as a political regime has mainly meant 
reflecting on the democratic or authoritarian nature of populism. This first perspecti-
ve has been embraced by authors such as Kornhauser (1959), Germani (1982), Canovan 
(1981) and Mair (2002). Studying populism as a symbolic construction has led us to re-
flect on the values and beliefs that guide the actions of populist figures. The contribu-
tions of Worsley (1969), Canovan (2002), Meny and Surel (2002), Taggart (2000), Kits-
chelt (1995) are certainly indicative of this approach. Finally, the study of populism as a 
communicative style has required focusing on the logic of building political discourse 
and the roles of political leadership. This last perspective is present in the studies of 
Knight (1998), Weyland (1999), Canovan (1981) and Taguieff (2003).
However, all of the studies on the subject show the search for the elements that charac-
terize the phenomenon of populism. Starting from Chiapponi (2014), he identifies three 
characteristics. The first element is the ethicization of the people, according to an image 
in which all people are endowed with intrinsically positive qualities and they are legiti-
mized to govern. The second element is an anti-elite stance against political elites, but also 
against economic, financial, and cultural elites as well. The third characteristic is an 
anti-institutional orientation marked by the rejection of the rules of the game of the repre-
sentative democracy. An ethically “just” people is opposed to elites who are incapable, 
and corrupt, and who “betray” the popular mandate. In this respect, there is a prejudice 
against parliamentarism because it prevents, with its formulas and its rules, the people 
from governing. The principle of representation is seen as the failure of popular sove-
reignty. The populist orientation assumes a government of the people to the letter, rejects 
the checks and balances of liberal democracy, and opposes the presence of intermedia-
ries between people and decision makers, in particular political parties. Instead, it fa-
vors a direct bond between the people and the elites and has a unanimous conception 
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of the will of the people that marginalizes pluralism (Chiapponi, 2014). According to 
Tarchi (2015) populism is, rather than an ideology, a mentality that identifies the peo-
ple as an organic totality, artificially divided by hostile forces. It attributes natural ethi-
cal qualities to them, compares their realism, hard work and integrity to the hypocrisy, 
inefficiency and corruption of the political, economic, social and cultural oligarchies, 
and claims its supremacy, as a source of legitimization of power, above all forms of re-
presentation and mediation (Tarchi, 2015:77). Ultimately, three elements characterize 
populism. The first one is an idea of the people as a homogeneous community endowed with 
intrinsic ethical and practical qualities, intended as a source of power. The second ele-
ment is the opposition between people and corrupt and incapable oligarchies, and the third one 
is the reassuring nature of the populist message, that aims to alleviate the pains of the people 
by pointing to a better future that will become reality through the actions of the popu-
lists (Tarchi 2015). For Revelli (2017) the elements of populism are respectively: 
 ♦ The low versus high opposition, which cuts across the political world without cultural 
or ideological differences and tends to represent the people against the elites. The 
oligarchy or a small group of people considered to be the usurpers and who would 
have as a corollary a post-ideological orientation, the so-called neither right nor left.
 ♦ A “moral” attitude, or in Manichaean terms, “good against evil”: honesty against 
usurpation.
 ♦ The personalization and the identification with a charismatic leader. According to 
Anselmi (2017), populism identifies a homogeneous community. It expresses an an-
ti-establishment attitude, and supports a charismatic leader in direct relationship 
with the community, and has a Manichean argumentative and communicative style 
aimed at generating political polarization. 
Muller (2016) states that 
populism is a particular moralistic imagination of politics, a way of perceiving the political 
world that sets a morally pure and fully unified, but ultimately fictional people against eli-
tes who are deemed corrupt or in some other way morally inferior (pp. 19-20).
Also as regards the affirmation of populist parties, the literature presents more than one 
vision: opposing interpretations that show the genesis of populism as a consequence 
of the phenomena of modernization that, in recent decades, have seen the birth of two 
types of losers: cultural and economic. The first interpretation links populism to cultural 
disorientation, caused by the emergence of post-materialist values starting in the 70’s, 
and brought to a boiling point by the problem of immigration. The second one sees the 
genesis of populism as consequence of economic hardship, the result of the transforma-
tion of the post-industrial society, which has created many losers and few winners. Yet 
another interpretation of the start of populism in democracy is based on political alie-
nation (Corbetta 2017). From this perspective, populism draws its nourishment from 
political crises, such as the inefficiency of government, the disruptive effects of the 
great scandals on trust in the institutions, the crisis of political parties and of the party 
system. These crises are capable of generating the perfect enemy of populism, namely 
the political elite (Chiapponi 2014). In this regard, it is easy to see that in the analysis of 
the Italian context, in the first phase of the studies on populism, attention was focused 
on Berlusconi and the League. Both phenomena have been interpreted as expressions 
of new politics, significantly linked to profound destructuring processes of the old party 
and political-institutional systems. They have also been linked to the idea of the people 
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(in the ethno-regionalist version for the League, and plebiscite in the case of Forza Ita-
lia) of a charismatic leader, and of a discursive style aimed at polarization. Ultimately, 
the discourse of the League and Berlusconi gave shape to a security-focused populism, 
located on the right side on the left-right axis. These represent, then, not only a neo-po-
pulist expression of the crisis of representative democracy, but also the conflicts of the 
new process of modernization connected to globalization (Antonelli 2018).
Then, there is a wide literature of both economists and political scientists that have 
linked populism to the expansion of public expenditure. Dornbusch and Edwards (1989) 
have defined macro-economic populism as that economic approach that emphasizes 
growth and income distribution and deemphasizes the risk of inflation and deficit fi-
nance, external constraints and the reaction of economic agents to aggressive non-mar-
ket policies. Drake (1982) has linked the definition of populism to economic nationalism 
in Latin America, which was deeply against laissez faire reforms, promoted by the IMF 
(International Monetary Fund). Then, Conniff (1999) argued that neo-liberalism and 
neo-populism remained antithetical to each other in Latin America also after 1989. Ed-
wards (2019) recently re-asserted the clear distinction between liberalism and populism. 
Thus, according to all these authors, populism is not ‘above the left-right’ cleavage, but is 
precisely the ideology of the radical (even if mostly democratic) left.  
In fact, according to Fossati (2020), right-wing leaders and parties can be called plebis-
citarian, but not populists, because the increase in public spending is lacking. In order 
to label a party as populist, it is necessary to consider both the economic aspect (the in-
crease in public spending) and the political one (the plebiscitarian link between leaders 
and the masses). Radical populism usually leads to the crisis of democracy (see Peron 
in Argentina, Allende in Chile and Garcia in Peru) or to authoritarianism (Chavez and 
Maduro in Venezuela), while moderate populism (Correa in Ecuador, Morales in Peru 
and Cristina Kirchner in Argentina) is compatible with democratic values, even if with 
some illiberal content. 
At last, literature shows that the Manichean vision is also present in the radical right 
(Mudde, 2004; Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2013). But the radical right (sovereignist, plebi-
scitarian, xenophobic) lacks the component of the strong increase in public spending. 
This allows to exclude the radical right parties from the family of populist parties, with-
out prejudice to both the Manichaean and the plebiscitarian dimensions.
In sum, populism is based on the following features, that emerge from the comparative 
literature: 
 ♦ a Manichean ideology with a binary cosmology of the world
 ♦ the expansion of the public expenditure with damaging effects (very high inflation 
rates) on the economy
 ♦ charismatic leaders making plebiscitary appeals to the population, with a limited role 
of intermediate actors (interests groups or parties) and institutions (parliaments or 
governments)
 ♦ a high mobilization process from above leading to a strong movimientismo of the 
lower sectors of the population (Fossati 2020).
The conceptual analysis, advanced in this article, starts from the main definitions that 
have been recently elaborated in the political science literature. However, it adds the 
increase of the public expenditure, that had already been identified as the main feature 
of populism in the debate of the 1970’s and 1980’s, especially in the researches on Latin 
America, and before populism could become so widespread in Europe. Adding the in-
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crease of public expenditure reduces the actors that can be labeled as populist (Sartori 
1980), precisely in order to avoid conceptual stretching. Thus, radical right parties, that do 
not want to increase public expenditure, but have a strong stance against immigration 
flows, are not populist, but xenophobic. These two categories of radical (populist and 
xenophobic) parties are both similar and different. They share the Manichean vision of 
the world and the direct link between leader and masses, that is to say the so-called ple-
biscitarianism (Fossati 2020). Thus, extreme right parties, that are usually labeled popu-
list, are called plebiscitarian xenophobic parties, according to my and Fossati’s definition. 
When they govern, there is not any attempt to expand public expenditure, on the con-
trary of the radical left populist parties. Radical right parties’ main political objective is 
to promote strong identity policies against immigration flows; thus, they may be called 
xenophobic. 
A more selective concept of populism could help to understand what happened in the 
Italian political system during Conte’s yellow-green government. 
The Contract for 
the Government of 
Change
A summary of 
ideological and 
policy discrepancies
The yellow-green government was formed by the two winning parties in the elections of 
2018. Five Star Movement got 32,7% of votes for the Chamber of Deputies and 32,2% for 
the Senate. The League was the most voted party of the right coalition with 17,4% (Cham-
ber of Deputies) and 17,6% (Senate). Democratic Party (with 18,7% and 19,1%) and Forza 
Italia (with 14% and 14,4%) were defeated, given that they lost many votes compared to 
the previous elections of 2013 (DP -6,5%; FI -7,5%). The Contract for the Government of 
Change1, signed on May 18th, 2018 by the League and the 5SM, consists of a sum of ideas 
and policies. The document identifies thirty points. They are the sectors of policy chosen 
by the government as areas of initiatives. These ones are the most relevant: 
 ♦ Public debt and deficit.
 ♦ Fiscal intervention. 
 ♦ Immigration and security policies. 
 ♦ Labor policies. 
 ♦ Pensions. 
 ♦ Social inclusion policies and citizenship income. 
 ♦ Regionalism. 
 ♦ Infrastructure policy. 
 ♦ European Union. 
This empirical section aims to ascertain the similarities and differences of position be-
tween the two political parties. To this purpose, first of all, the objectives and intentions 
set out in the Government Contract for Change will be presented. Subsequently, the 
empirical evolution of the two coalition parties will be analyzed starting from June 1st, 
2018, the day the yellow-green government took office. 
1. Contract for the Government 
of Change (pdf). Available on 
download.repubblica.it (May 18, 
2018).
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Policy initiatives 
outlined in the 
Government Contract 
Public debt and deficit. 
The Government Contract sets two objectives. The first is a public debt reduction pro-
gram to be pursued not through austerity, but through measures that stimulate gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth. The second objective relates to deficit policies. In this 
regard, it is expected (through the renegotiation of EU treaties and European standards) 
a multi-year program aimed at ensuring the financing of the proposals covered by the 
Government Contract through the saving of resources by cutting waste, managing debt 
and implementing appropriate and limited use of the deficit.
Tax
First of all, the initiative aims to sterilize the EU safeguard clauses which would, if 
applied, increase the value added tax (VAT) rates and excise duties. Secondly, it lays out 
a tax exemption and simplification program for families, businesses and VAT holders. 
The adoption of courageous and revolutionary reform measures is envisaged, with a 
view to reduce the tax burden and improve the relationship between financial adminis-
tration and taxpayers. The key concept is the ‘flat tax’. This reform aims to introduce two 
fixed tax rates (15% and 20%), with a deduction system to guarantee the progressiveness 
of the tax. The principle of the no tax area remains untouched.
Immigration
The Government Contract proposes a review of asylum and immigration policies wi-
thin the EU. The objective is to reduce the pressure of immigration flows on external 
border states, to examine the European missions in the Mediterranean which penalize 
Italy, especially the clauses that provide for the landing of ships used for operations in 
ports without sharing responsibility with other European countries. The request is that 
the Dublin Regulation2 will be passed and that the principle of fairly sharing of respon-
sibilities will be respected through the mandatory and automatic relocation of asylum 
seekers between EU Member States. Finally, revisions are proposed for the procedures 
for awarding refugee status (or its revocation) as well as the establishment of specific 
types of crimes.
Labor
The Government Contract proposes a legislation that establishes a minimum hourly 
wage for all categories of workers and industries in which the minimum wage is not 
set by collective bargaining. Likewise, a structural reduction of the tax wedge3 is deemed 
necessary. Finally, the intention is to promote the reform and strengthening of emplo-
yment centers, to introduce policy to combat job insecurity, build more stable working 
relationships, and promote job training.
2. The Regulation of Dublin (1990) 
establishes the principles that 
regulate the member State res-
ponsibility regarding the recep-
tion of migrants. The signing of 
the Dublin agreement created 
the conditions for the introduc-
tion of the so-called one-stop 
clause. This clause identifies the 
first country to which an asy-
lum request is forwarded as the 
only State entity competent to 
deal with this request. The first 
regulation was followed by the 
2nd Regulation (2003) and the 3rd 
Regulation (2013) of Dublin.
3. The tax wedge is the difference 
between the net pay (how much a 
worker takes home after taxes) and 
the cost incurred by the company 
(how much that worker costs the 
company).
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Pensions
The revision of some aspects of the Fornero law4 is planned. An important objective is to 
give workers the opportunity to retire when the sum of their age and number of years of 
tax contributions is at least 100 (number of one hundred).
Basic Income and citizenship pension
The aim is to introduce an income subsidy for Italian citizens who are in need. The 
disbursement amount (set at 780 euros) is established on the basis of the risk of poverty 
threshold, calculated on both a recipient’s income and assets. The disbursement of the 
basic income presupposes an active commitment by the beneficiary, who must adhere 
to job offers from employment centers. A basic pension is also provided for those who 
live below the minimum poverty threshold. A supplement is proposed for the pensioner 
who has a check of less than 780 euros per month.
Institutional reforms (differentiated regionalism)
In terms of regionalism, the commitment is to favor the assignment of greater auto-
nomy to all the regions that reasonably request it, in accordance with art. 116º, third 
paragraph, of the Constitution. In this sense, the commitment is to conclude the nego-
tiations (already underway) between the government and the regions. The Government 
Contract specifies that the recognition of additional responsibilities have be accompa-
nied by the transfer of the resources for their exercise.
Infrastructure policy - High-Speed Train (HST)
 
With regard to the Turin-Lyon high-speed line, the Government Contract establishes a 
commitment to fully discuss the project in the application of the agreement between 
Italy and France.
European Union
The government announces that Italy will request the full implementation of the ob-
jectives established in 1992 with the Maastricht Treaty, and confirmed in 2007 with the 
Lisbon Treaty. It identifies the following objectives: 
 ♦ strengthening the role and powers of the European Parliament
 ♦ decision-making coordination between Europe and Italian regional representation
 ♦ the return of responsibilities to States, if they are better handled at this level. 
According to the Contract, it is also necessary to review the system of market rules, in 
order to, on the one hand, eliminate predatory pricing and other decisions detrimental 
to the interests of small industry within the EU and, on the other hand, promote the 
marked of excellence Italian production. Regarding to the EU budget, in the perspective 
4. The expression Fornero reform 
(or Fornero law) indicates the 
pension reform promoted by the 
Monti government (November 
2011-April 2013) on the proposal 
of the Minister of Labor and So-
cial Policies, Elsa Fornero. See 
Art. 24º of Legislative Decree 6, 
December 2011, Nº 201 (Dispo-
sizioni in materia di trattamenti 
pensionistici).
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of the seven-year plan, it is established the initiative to renegotiate, in order to make it 
coherent with the Government Contract. Together with the other European partners, 
Italian government calls for a review of European economic governance structures (mo-
netary policy, stability and growth pact, fiscal compact, the European Stability Mecha-
nism, procedure for excessive macroeconomic imbalances, etc.). Moreover, the govern-
ment specifies that it will oppose any excessive weakening of protections of citizens’ 
rights that may arise from cooperation treaties between the EU and other countries. 
Finally, the government document asks that the EU explicitly recognize that Italy repre-
sents an external geographical border, which has to be adequately protected, and that 
EU amends the mechanisms for managing EU funds pre-assigned to Italy.
Easier said than done




Under the new legislature, the first important act of the Government of Change was the 
so-called Dignity Decree5. The deputy prime minister Di Maio, minister of labor and 
social policy and minister of economic development, promoted it with strong determi-
nation. The use of legislative decree, which over the years seems to have been interpre-
ted as almost an ordinary instrument of lawmaking, even in this case constituted the 
fastest way to implement the government’s plan. In addition, in the particular approach 
of the political majority, the legislative decree was the most immediate way for the 5SM 
to respond, in terms of media visibility, to the activism of its government partner with 
respect to relevant issues, such as immigration and security (Di Noia, 2018:4). Although 
the decree deals with various subjects, its focus is the employment policy. More precise-
ly, the employment provisions have affected the fixed-term employment contract: they 
have changed the Jobs Act6 rules, introduced by the Renzi government (Feb. 2014-Dec. 
2016). The maximum duration of fixed-terms contracts falls from 36 to 24 months. The 
decree reintroduces the reasons, an obligation for companies (in case of the contract re-
newal after the first 12 months) to provide the reasons why that renewal is essential. The 
reasons have to fall within one of the three conditions provided for by the same decree:
 ♦ temporary and objective needs, which are unrelated to the ordinary activities of the 
company
 ♦ replacement of other workers
 ♦ temporary, significant and non-foreseeable increases in ordinary business activity. 
If the fixed-term contract exceeds 12 months and the reasons are absent, than its re-
newal is automatic, indefinitely. The maximum number of extensions drops from 5 to 4. 
The new rules are effective from November 1st, 2018. In the event of unlawful dismissal, 
the maximum unemployment benefits rise from 4 to 6 months. An tax increase of 0,5% 
is expected, compared to 1,4% (already provided for by the Fornero law) on the taxable 
income for social security purposes, paid by the entrepreneur, for subordinate, fixed 
term employment relationships (in case of renewal of fixed-term contracts, including 
the outsourced labor contracts). The aim of these measures was to encourage the en-
trepreneurs towards the use stable contractual forms. For entrepreneurs, however, it 
marked a negative sign, a return to rigid and greater constraints for companies, and 
elements that penalize labor. In particular, General Confederation of Italian Industry’s 
criticisms focused on the protocol for fixed-term contracts. According to the entrepre-
5. See Law Decree 12 July 2018, 
Nº 87 (Disposizioni urgenti per la 
dignità dei lavoratori e delle impre-
se) enacted in Law August 9th 
2018, Nº 96.
6. See Legislative Decree June 
15th 2015, Nº 81 (Disciplina orga-
nica dei contratti di lavoro e revi-
sione della normativa in tema di 
mansioni, a norma dell’articolo 1º, 
comma 7, della legge 10 dicembre 
2014, Nº 183).
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neurs, the restrictive rules were a step towards the wrong direction, just as the job mar-
ket was showing signs of recovery (Barone 2018). The decree came into force on July 14th, 
2018 and became fully operational from November 1st, following the end (October 31st) of 
the transitional period. The added fixed-term contract regulations and increased social 
security contributions, after a few months, led to the rekindling of the conflict between 
the two coalition parties. The divergence of opinions and interests, resolved through a 
delegation in favor of the coalition member with stronger electoral weight at the begin-
ning of the legislature, became evident in June of 2019. After success in the 2019 Euro-
pean elections, Salvini decided to collect the protests from General Confederation of 
Italian Industry and small business owners from the Northern electoral districts that 
have always been party strongholds. Between May and June of 2019, the conflict over 
labor policy, born at the beginning of the legislature, resurfaced. The National Social 
Security Institute Report data (from the first quarter of 2019) showed a sharp decline of 
the number of renewals of fixed-term contracts and a collapse of the outsourced labor. 
In June of 2019, these empirical data prompted the League deputies to prepare a bill 
containing the provision to entrust to unions the task of formulating additional reasons 
with respect to the three conditions indicated in the ‘dignity decree’ in order to recover a 
part of flexibility. This change of position became a strong point of friction between two 
parties, given that for the 5 Star Movement the dignity decree and its effects on the quality 
of labor had represented a measure of high symbolic value. Approved at the beginning 
of the legislature, the decree showed the ability of the 5SM to drive all government’s 
policy (Tucci, 2019).
Immigration
Actually, at the beginning of the legislature, it was precisely the choice of attitude 
towards the EU, which led to the emergence of very significant conflicts within the 
coalition. After the establishment of the government, the League emphasized a criti-
cal orientation towards the EU. Salvini proposed an alliance with the Hungarian pri-
me minister Orban, leader of the so-called Visegrad group (V4) made up of Hungary, 
Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. During the migration crisis that exploded in 
2015, Orban proposed a radical anti-immigration strategy, against revising the Dublin 
agreements and managing migration flows collectively (Fabbrini, 2018a). This issue will 
be the point of strength on which the leader of the League will build the success of his 
party: immigration has, in fact, called into question the identity of national citizenship 
and raised issues that affect security (Fabbrini, 2018b). On the contrary, the 5SM was 
internally divided in respect of this issue and it was difficult to find a united voice, a 
condition that facilitated a delegation to Salvini. 
The result of this delegation was the so-called Security Decree or Salvini Decree7. Faced 
with the opposition to the decree by a group of 5SM parliamentarians, the government 
chose to resort to the confidence vote, both in the Senate (163 votes for, 59 against), and 
in the Chamber of Deputies (336 votes for, 249 against). Amended by the manifestly un-
constitutional elements, the signing of the decree was accompanied, on October 4th, by 
a letter from president Mattarella to the prime minister on the risks of constitutional 
violation that the decree could generate in the implementation phase. The law inclu-
des forty article, fifteen of which are dedicated to immigration policy. In this matter, 
the review was quite extensive. The provisions concern: the request for asylum, huma-
nitarian protection, stays in the repatriation centers, citizenship, free legal assistance, 
7. See Law Decree, October 4th, 
2018, Nº 113 (Disposizioni urgenti 
in materia di protezione internazio-
nale e immigrazione, sicurezza pu-
bblica, nonché misure per la funzio-
nalità del Ministero dell’interno e 
l’organizzazione e il funzionamento 
dell’Agenzia nazionale per l’ammi-
nistrazione e la destinazione dei beni 
sequestrati e confiscati alla crimina-
lità organizzata. Delega al Gover-
no in materia di riordino dei ruoli 
e delle carriere del personale delle 
Forze di polizia e delle Forze armate) 
enacted, with amendments, in 
Law, December 1st, 2018, Nº 132.
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asylum seeker and refugee protection system (SPRAR) centers8. With regard to asylum 
requests, the number of crimes that invalidate requests for political asylum were increa-
sed, and now lead to immediate expulsion. Regarding the second point, the law introdu-
ces the abolition of humanitarian protection: in the event of humanitarian emergencies, 
it guarantees a residence permit to foreign citizens who request it. Furthermore, the 
times for detention in repatriation centers were doubled (from a maximum of 90 days to 
180 days). The new rules formulate the revocation of citizenship: if a person was consi-
dered a possible danger to the State, the revocation of citizenship could be prompted in 
the event of a definitive conviction for terrorist offenses. In addition, an application for 
citizenship may be rejected even if submitted by someone who has married an Italian 
citizen. Moreover, there is the revocation of free legal aid for migrants if their appeal 
against the refusal of humanitarian protection is declared inadmissible. The SPRAR 
centers received new rules: the small centers that host migrants, with the backing of ci-
ties, will no longer be able to welcome asylum seekers, but only unaccompanied minors 
and those who have already received international protection. Finally, the funds for re-
patriation were funded with € 500,000 for 2018, €1.5 million for 2019 and € 500,000 for 
2020. However, the security decree left the problems of controlling illegal immigration 
and repatriation intact. In June 2019, the government approved a second text, called 
Security Decree bis9, which introduced sanctioning rules for non-governmental organi-
zations (NGOs), engaged in rescues at sea, which violate the prohibitions on entry into 
Italian territorial waters.
2019 Budget Law: public debt and deficit
Conversely, the heart of the 5SM political platform was the citizenship income. With re-
gard to the fiscal budget (September 2018) a sort of pact was established between the 
League and the 5SM: support for the legislative decree on security and immigration in 
exchange for a common front to check more resources and go beyond the 2% deficit to 
start the citizenship income. The strategy of the Ministry of economy and finance (MEF), 
which was run by minister Tria, was to quantify the deficit for 2019 within the maximum 
threshold of 1,6%, a figure already agreed upon with the European Commission. This line 
wanted to ensure a descending trajectory of the debt and defusing the VAT clauses (12-
13 billion), in order to shelter Italy from EU infringement procedures and market tur-
bulence. Anyway, the political confrontation between minister Tria and the two deputy 
premieres Di Maio and Salvini hypothesized an increase to 1,9%, if not more than 2% 
(Pesole, 2018). The budget for 2019 was a decisive step for the Five Stars: the availability 
of resources to launch the citizenship income was an essential element to strengthen the 
bond with their voters, especially in the South. This ignited the conflict with minister Tria 
who, faced with the request to increase the deficit with respect to GDP to 2,4%, feared an 
exit from the government, and was then forced to surrender. Concerns over the coun-
try’s financial equilibrium, the negative reactions of financial markets and the European 
Commission not only attracted the attention of the MEF, but also that of President Mat-
tarella, and of national and international institutional actors, such as the governor of the 
Bank of Italy and the European Central Bank president, Mario Draghi. At the end of Oc-
tober, president Draghi expressed concerns that such a high level of spread (around 300) 
would have caused serious damage to the credit system (Palmerini, 2018a and Palmerini, 
2018b). The update note of the 2018 Economic and Financial Document (EFD), approved 
by the Cabinet on September 27th, 2018, establishes a deficit reduction profile for a three-
8. See Law July, 30th 2002, Nº 189 
(Modifica alla normativa in materia 
di immigrazione e di asilo). This 
law established the SPRAR, the 
Ministry of the Interior Service 
for the local management of 
reception, assistance and inte-
gration projects for asylum seek-
ers. Through the same law, the 
Ministry of the Interior estab-
lished the coordination struc-
ture sys tem (a central informa-
tion, pro motion, consultancy, 
monito ring and technical sup-
port ser vice for local authorities) 
entrus ting its management to 
the National Association of Ital-
ian Municipalities (ANCI).
9. See Law Decree, June 14th, 
2019, Nº 53 (Disposizioni urgen-
ti in materia di ordine e sicurezza 
pubblica) enacted in Law, Au-
gust 8th, 2019, Nº 77.
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year period: 2,4% (2019), 2,1% (2020), and 1,8% (2021). The budget raised many doubts 
about sustainability, against 1,6% GDP growth, and aroused negative judgments of the 
Bank of Italy, the Court of Auditors and the Parlia mentary Budget Office, and these insti-
tutions are an integral part of European procedure. The possible negative assessment of 
the budget summary by the European Commission, and the effects that this result would 
have on the markets, were at the center of the concern of the prime minister Conte, en-
gaged in work of conviction at the EU headquarters, and of the President Mattarella. In 
mid-October, the European Commission sent a warning letter to the Italian government, 
due to a drastic increase in the GDP deficit. All heads of government of the Eurozone 
member states (Fabbrini, 2018c) recalled (through the Commission) our country to res-
pect the three rules of the Stability and Growth Pact: nominal deficit budget within the 
3% of GDP threshold, balance of the structural deficit, and public debt no more than 60% 
of GDP. On October 23rd, the Italian programmatic budget was formally contested: the 
Italian government had three weeks to correct the budget for 2019 by aligning it with the 
stability pact, under penalty of an infringement procedure for excessive debt in relation 
to the violation of the debt rule. This procedure, never applied before, would remain in 
force until the debt went down (Bastasin, 2018a). The recommendations of President Ma-
ttarella, during the parliamentary examination, made possible the development of cons-
tructive dialogue with the EU institutions (Palmerini, 2018c). The resilience of the EU, 
the reaction of distrust of the markets and the severe criticisms leveled by social players 
(both domestic and European politicians and institutions) led the government to enter 
into negotiations, which, after two months, saw a reduction in the nominal deficit from 
2,4 to 2,04%. On December 22nd, the government presented to the Senate a maxi-amend-
ment that fully replaced the draft budget law for 2019. The law was approved without a 
prior assessment by the Senate Budget Commission (Fabbrini, 2018d). After the vote of 
confidence on December 28th, and the signing of the president Mattarella, the budget 
came into force on January 1st, 2019, preventing the application of the provisional exer-
cise. The cost and financial risk of anti-EU positions, after two months of negotiations 
with the European institutions, was considered superior to the political advantages, even 
if the agreement - matured in the framework of the end of the mandate of the European 
institutions - was limited to verifying the minimum accounting requirements (Bastasin, 
2018b). The conflict that took place in the autumn of 2018 between the yellow-green go-
vernment (growth based on more debt) and the EU (defense of containment and debt 
reduction rules) ended with a difficult compromise, waiting for the European elections 
for the recommencement of the Parliament and the formation of the new Commission. 
It would re-emerge the following autumn, during the approval procedure for the budget 
law for 2020.
Citizenship income and number of 100. 
Mid-January 2019 witnessed the launch of the two measures that, during the electoral 
campaign, played a crucial role in gaining electoral consensus of the two governing par-
ties: citizenship income and the so-called number of one hundred. League’s position on 
the citizenship income (as expressed by undersecretary Giorgetti) was that of distrust, 
due to the charitable nature of the measure. This position was shared with the unions, 
especially CGIL, due to the mixed nature of the measure (contrasting poverty and labor 
policies). The critical views of the three main labor unions were also affected by the fear 
that the government’s initiatives (in matters such as the citizenship income, number of 
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one hundred, and minimum wage) would hurt their function of representation, which 
constituted their raison d’être (Palmerini, 2019a). The citizenship income10 constitutes 
a measure of active labor policy, fighting poverty, inequality and social exclusion. The 
perception of income is associated with a path to work and social reintegration, as spe-
cified by a pact for work or a pact for social inclusion, which the beneficiary is required 
to sign. Despite the government pact, there were many significant restrictive amend-
ments proposed by the League before the decree was converted into law (Barbieri, 2019). 
Only a few amendments were accepted before the law was approved by a confidence 
vote. According to estimates, the policy included around 3,6 million individuals and 1,3 
million households. For this measure, the government allocated 7,1 billion for 2019 (5,6 
billion to be paid to applicants and 1,5 billion to upgrade employment centers), 8 bi-
llion for 2020 and 8,3 billion for 2021. However, the implementation has showed that 
the number of requests forwarded was significantly lower than the government’s ex-
pectations. Data from the National Social Security Institute Observatory, updated for 
January 2020, showed that approximately 4 billion and 358 million euros have been paid 
on basic income and pensions, respectively. The calculation is the sum of the amounts 
disbursed for the subsidies starting from the start-up month (April 2019). The important 
element is that, in 2019, the disbursement remained below the four billion threshold, re-
sulting in 3 billion 849 million euros, compared to the 5.6 billion allocated in the budget 
for 2019: a savings of almost 1.8 billion was therefore accrued. The applications accepted 
by INPS were 1 million 119 thousand for basic income and pensions. Among the families 
that were awarded the benefits, benefits to 60 thousand families have stopped. So the 
families receiving basic income (933 thousand, for 2,4 million individuals) and pensions 
(126 thousand with 143 thousand people involved) are, overall, 1 million, 59 thousand, 
corresponding to 2 million, 562 thousand individuals. The average monthly amount re-
ceived is 496 euros11.
The decree, in addition to regulating the basic income, contains provisions for the num-
ber of 100. It should be noted that, although initially the two government parties propo-
sed different combinations of the minimum age and years of contribution requirements 
(League: mix 64/36; 5SM: mix 59/41), the purpose to reform the Fornero law was similar. 
For both parties, the reform of the Fornero law had been an important issue of the 2018 
electoral campaign. The possibility of accelerating the exit from the labor market for tho-
se who had reached a specific age and social security conditions, in the vision of both par-
ties, would have favored generational turnover and youth employment. On this shared 
basis, the decree introduces the possibility of retiring with the mix of 62 years of age and 
38 years of social security contributions, in addition to the traditional retirement chan-
nels provided for by the Fornero Law (i.e. early retirement and old-age pension). The 
measure has an experimental profile: it applies to those who achieve the aforementioned 
requirements by December 31st, 202112. The government has allocated about 20 billion in 
total for this 3-year measure (3,8 billion for 2019; 7,8 billion for 2020; 8,3 billion for 2021). 
However, in 2019, the applications submitted for number of one hundred were less than 
expected (36% of qualifying subjects did not apply) and the cost savings were considera-
ble: the expenditure for early pensions was €2,6 billion and savings were €1,2 billion. For 
2020, the Parliamentary Budget Office has confirmed the government’s forecasts with its 
savings estimates of 2 billion out of the 7,8 initially planned. The alarm is instead for 2021, 
the year in which, those who have not applied in the previous two years, could decide to 
retire early with a number of 100. For 2021, the government has estimated 8,3 billion for 
the number of 100 but, at the same time, expects savings of 1,3 billion. The cost would be 7 
billion, but the Parliamentary Budget Office expects savings of only 600 million euros13. 
10. See Law December 30th, 2018, 
Nº 145 (Bilancio di previsione dello 
Stato per l’anno finanziario 2019 e 
bilancio pluriennale per il triennio 
2019-2021); Law Decree January 
28th, 2019, Nº 4 (Disposizioni ur-
genti in materia di reddito di cit-
tadinanza e di pensioni) enacted 
in Law March 28th, 2019, Nº 26. 
The decree introduced a basic 
income and pension, as well 
as an early retirement policy 
known as the number of 100. The 
budget law for 2020 (Law De-
cember 27th, 2019, Nº 160) con-









13. See Rapporto sulla politica di 
bilancio 2020. Available on line at 
https://www.upbilancio.it/rappor-
to-sulla-politica-di-bilancio-2020/.
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From February 2019 onwards, the negotiations between the two parties began to break 
down and, by the first half of August, conflict crystallized on three policies: first, the 
High-Speed Train (HST) Torino-Lione14; second, the law for regional autonomy; third, 
the budget plan for 2020. 
HST Torino-Lione. 
On the first policy, it should be noted that the Government Contract affirms the 
government’s commitment to re-examine the feasibility of the project, in order to verify 
the expected costs and benefits of the project. A technical commission was entrusted 
with the task of developing a cost-benefit analysis, and the report was delivered on 
February 11th, 2019. The strategy of mediation, based on the cost/benefit analysis, proved 
ineffective and did not prevent a conflict between two different and unbridgeable 
political identities. In the analysis commissioned by the government, the costs exceeded 
the benefits, but the League presented its counter-analysis showing pro-HST results. 
This was the first case of breach of the contract signed in June 2018 (Palmerini, 2019b). 
Then, a period of inactivity began: it was ended by a public statement of the prime 
minister on July 23rd, 2019. The prime minister, Giuseppe Conte, gave the go-ahead for 
the resumption of construction on the HST, thanks to the increase in EU funds for the 
completion of the project and for the national section, leading to, on the one hand, the 
triumph of Salvini and, on the other hand, the disappointment of the 5SM. To contain 
the protest of his supporters, Di Maio asked for a vote by the parliament to block the 
resumption of construction, with the knowledge that the parliamentary strength of the 
5SM would been completely insufficient to achieve the result, given the contrary vote 
of the League and the oppositions (DP and Forza Italia) (Bartoloni, 2019). Work on the 
Italian section of the Turin-Lyon line started again in December 2019, after more than 
a year of suspension. 
Regionalism
The second policy was the differentiated (or asymmetric) regionalism. This refers to the 
assignment of special conditions of autonomy to regions. The further forms of auto-
nomy can be recognized: 
 ♦ in all matters that the art. 117º, third paragraph, assigns to the concurrent legislative 
jurisdiction
 ♦ in a further limited number of subjects reserved by the same art. 117º, second para-
graph, to the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of the State (the organization of justice 
of the peace; general rules of education; protection of the environment, ecosystem 
and cultural heritage). 
The assignment of these enhanced forms of autonomy must be established with a 
reinforced law, which, from a substantial point of view, is formulated on the basis of 
an agreement between the State and the Region, having acquired the opinion of local 
authorities, in compliance with the principles pursuant to art. 119º of the Constitution 
on financial autonomy; while, from a procedural point of view, it is approved by the 
Chambers with an absolute majority of the members. The issue of the recognition of forms 
14. HST (High-Speed Train) in-
dicates 235km of railway infra-
structure with advanced fea-
tures, dedicated to the transport 
of goods and people between 
Turin and Lyon. It is intended 
to support the historical line that 
passes through the Frejus rail-
way tunnel. This high-speed line 
was conceived in the 1990s, and 
has been under construction 
since the early 2000’s.
Revista Euro Latinoamericana de Análisis Social y Político
Vol. 2,  Nº 2  - 2020144RELASP
of differentiated autonomy pursuant to article 116, third paragraph, of the Constitution was 
brought up in the debate over the relationship between the State and the Regions after 
the non-confirmatory outcome of the constitutional referendum of December 4th, 201615. 
Following the initiatives undertaken by Lombardia, Veneto and Emilia-Romagna, the 
govern ment opened negotiations with the three Northern regions. The first two regions 
held a consultative referendum on October 22nd, 2017 on the assignment of further norms 
and special conditions of autonomy. In both regions, the result of referendum was 
favorable to autonomy. On October 3rd, 2017, the regional assembly of Emilia-Romagna 
approved a resolution (pushed by the president of the region) to begin the procedure 
required by the third paragraph of art. 116º of the Constitution to sign the agreement 
with the government. The three regions and the government entered into a preliminary 
agreement for the assignment of greater forms of autonomy on February 28th, 2018. 
Subsequently, other regions started a dialogue with the government on this topic. One 
of the most delicate points of the negotiation was that of the financial resources to 
accompany the process of strengthening regional autonomy16. Regarding this issue, in 
February 2019, the League promoted the law on stronger autonomy, which provided for 
the sharing of taxes (personal income tax and VAT) of the Northern regions (Lombardy, 
Veneto, Emilia Romagna). The risk was an imbalance of resources between North and 
South and the 5SM opposed the plan. However, decisions on the HST and on stronger 
regional autonomy were postponed until after the European elections of May 26th, 2019, 
while the economic slowdown and any financial risks came back to the foreground of 
debate. 
2020 Budget Law: public debt and deficit 
The third policy concerned economic reforms, which had always been the priority of 
Salvini, because of his constituencies in the North. The lack of expected GDP growth 
led to launch two new decrees17 before the EFD for 2020 was prepared. The difficulties 
were in the fact that the resources (23 billion) will have to be found so that the increase 
in VAT is avoided. The General Accounting Office dossier on the budget showed that in 
2019 the share of pensions and social assistance spending increased significantly, above 
all due to the funds for financing the citizenship income the number of one hundred. The 
data show that current Italian public expenditure came to, in 2019, 45,5% of GDP, with 
an increase of 0,7% compared to 2018. The trend is in contrast with the same figure in 
the Eurozone, and the wider area of the EU (Trovati 2019). 
The conflict between the League and the Five Stars also characterized the electoral cam-
paigns that saw heated competition between the two parties. Three regional elections 
fell in the first year of the yellow-green government. The center-right coalition won the 
elections in Abruzzo, Sardegna and Basilicata, and Salvini’s League was the leading par-
ty of the coalition. Moreover, the elections marked the decline of the 5SM: all the data 
showed the transfer of votes from the 5SM to the League (D’Alimonte, 2019a). The elec-
toral campaigns pushed the 5SM even more to the left and the League to the right. In the 
European elections of May 26th, the opposition between Salvini and Di Maio continued: 
first on the right, to win the electorate of Forza Italia, and second on the left, in search 
of the votes coming out of the DP. The League won 34% of the electoral consensus and 
launched a pressure against its governmental alliance, which would contribute to pro-
voke a governmental crisis. 







17. See Law Decree, April 30th, 
2019, Nº 34 (Misure urgenti di cre-
scita economica e per la risoluzio-
ne di specifiche situazioni di crisi) 
enacted Law, June 28th, 2019, Nº 
58; Law Decree, April 18th, 2019, 
Nº 32 (Disposizioni urgenti per 
il rilancio del settore dei contratti 
pubblici, per l’accelerazione degli 
interventi infrastrutturali, di rige-
nerazione urbana e di ricostruzione 
a seguito di eventi sismici) enacted 
in Law June 14th, 2019, Nº 55.
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Thus, within the government coalition the conflict increased: the possibility of distri-
buting benefits was gone, because the next budget law would not allow for it (factoring in 
the deficit the ‘number of one hundred’ and the citizenship income). During the prepara-
tion of the 2020 budget law -on which many expectations were hung, such as the reform 
of the income tax according to a reduction in the number of tax rates (League proposed 
flat tax)- the EU Commission sent a letter to Italy on May 29th. The UE Commi ssion made 
a request for clarification on the reasons for the increase in public debt bet ween 2017 and 
2018. Minister Tria replied to this letter (while Di Maio defended the new welfare policies: 
the citizenship income and the number of 100) indicating market stabilization, reductions 
in spending coming from welfare policies, whose savings (8-10 billion over three years) 
would contribute to reducing the Italian deficit. The cost savings indicates, for both mea-
sures, a significantly lower amount of budget requirements (by about 20%) compared to 
the projections based on the 2019 budget. The letter accompanied the Report on relevant 
factors that the EU Commission would have to study and verify. As in the previous year, 
at stake was the risk of an infringement procedure for excessive debt, the opening of 
which would be up to the Council, on the recommendation of the Commission. Checking 
would started precisely from the overrun of the 2018 debt objectives (Perrone and Tro-
vati, 2019; Colombo and Rogari, 2019; Rogari, 2019, Romano and Trovati, 2019). To make 
the debate with Brussels less difficult, the data released by the MEF were better than ex-
pected and which showed a deficit reduction. On June 3rd, prime minister Conte called on 
the two coalition parties to take responsibility, on pain of his resignation. The distance 
between the League and the Five Stars had become clearer that ever: a relationship com-
plicated after the European elections delivered 34% of the votes to Salvini’s party. League 
pressed for the measures of its program: strengthened autonomy for the regions of the 
North, the HST Turin-Lyon, and a flat tax. Above all, Salvini’s party considered priority 
measures for the next budget the single rate of 15% for family incomes up to 50 thou-
sand euros and a gradual reduction of the tax rate in force for companies. With regard to 
this topic, the Five Star Movement counter-proposed three different rates for employees 
and retirees. The priority for the 5SM was instead the minimum wage, a measure that 
the League would introduce only for those outside the collective agreement. These di-
vergences were obviously destined to weigh on the budget law currently being prepared 
which, according to President Conte, would nevertheless have to maintain the balance of 
the accounts, since the European rules remain in force until we succeed in changing them (Per-
rone, 2019). Conte and Tria continued negotiations with the EU, maintaining budgetary 
discipline in the face of the imposition of an infringement procedure for excessive debt. 
This is the main juncture in order to grasp the future events that led to the government 
crisis. On June 5th, the EU Commission -with its Report on the public accounts of the 
member states of the European Union (EU)- announced that it considered justified the 
opening of an infringement procedure for excessive debt. However, this decision will be 
up to the finance ministers of the European governments (Ecofin) who will have to meet 
in July and to decide by qualified majority. The outcome will depend on Italian choic-
es: the current year’s public accounts adjustment and a convincing financial adjustment 
for next year would avoid an infringement procedure. But Di Maio confirmed the invi-
olability of the citizenship income and ‘number of 100’, while Salvini - bolstered by the 
European electoral result - categorically excluded the hypothesis of a corrective budget 
and insisted on the introduction of the flat tax and the missing increase of VAT in the 
deficit in the next budget (Fiammeri 2019). The key point, for president Conte and minis-
ter Tria, was how to conduct negotiations with the EU (which called for the reduction of 
the 2019 deficit through a corrective 2020 budget respected the rules) in order to avoid 
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the infringement procedure, starting from the irrevocable requests of the two majori-
ty parties. In other words, the government’s activity presented two different directions. 
On the one hand, Conte and Tria were engaged to negotiate a spending review with EU 
institutions and, on the other hand, the two vice premier, Salvini and Di Maio, were en-
gaged to request policies in deficit. Salvini focused on the flat tax in deficit, and Di Maio 
reiterated the immediate implementation of the minimum wage18. On June 19th, the Cabi-
net started the adjustment of the accounts to be presented in Brussels: bill was finalized 
with the adjustment of the budget forecasts, which the MEF presented to the Chamber 
in June, on the basis of the consistency of the active and passive surpluses. It was about 
6 billion to rebalance the 2019 accounts without a real corrective measure, in order to 
avoid the infringement procedure. In addition, Conte and Tria confirmed that the Italian 
government’s cash flow estimates are better than those predicted by the EU Commission: 
there is additional revenue and lower-than-expected expenses from the application of 
citizenship income and number of 100. Salvini returned to press the government with an 
ultimatum on the flat tax and the request to reduce taxes by at least 10 billion on the 2020 
accounts. He also asked for acceleration of the differentiated autonomy and the HST. The 
aim was to achieve concrete results for the North under the threat of dissolution of the 
coalition and the holding of early elections. The Cabinet of June 26th discussed the MEF’s 
2019 deficit reduction plan of around 8 billion euros, in view of the negotiation with the 
EU. The reduction of the deficit-GDP ratio provided for three points. 
 ♦ The cut of 2 billion of expenditures from the budget of the ministries (the clause of 
the expenditure foreseen in the 2018 documents). 
 ♦ A greater revenue: 3 billion euros of higher tax revenues and dividends of the inves-
tee companies. 
 ♦ The saving of 3 billion euros of lower expenses (compared to the budgeted ones) co-
ming from number of 100 and the citizenship income. 
These measures reduced the deficit in a natural way, according to the words of minister 
Tria, and bring it back to about 2% within the security level of the deficit, removing the 
obstacles for an agreement with the EU (Rogari and Trovati, 2019). On July 2nd, the go-
vernment presented the budget adjustment plan: the adjustment launched by Italy (of 
7,6 billion euros, equal to 0,42% of GDP) convinced Brussels, which finally deemed the 
2019 budget trend acceptable and promoted the closure of the proposal for an exces-
sive debt sanction. The Tria-Conte decision to include in the public finance balances 
the lower expenses for citizenship income and the number of one hundred avoided the 
opening of an infringement procedure and marked a clear success. The League-5SM 
executive had to downsize its commitments, both in December 2018 and in June 2019. 
Once the risk of the infringement procedure has been overcome, Matteo Salvini retur-
ned to ask for autonomy for the Northern regions, but the divergence with the 5SM 
on the competences to be transferred and on the new equalization fund was very pro-
nounced. The conflict became particularly acute in the field of school education, when 
the possibility for the regions to finance the teachers’ salaries was canceled after the 
exclusion from the regionalization of the recruitment of teachers (Trovati and Tucci, 
2019) and cultural heritage, in which the rift concerned the transfer of competences to 
monuments and archaeological areas. The other thorny item was the distribution of re-
sources, which if they came from extra revenue produced by the regions of Lombardy 
and Veneto, the 5SM would like them to be distributed to other regions for the same 
functions transferred to the two Northern regions (Fiammeri and Trovati, 2019). 
18. See Draft Law July 12th, 2018, 
Nº 658 (Disposizioni per l’istituzio ne 
del salario minimo orario) presen-
ted by Senator Nunzia Catalfo 
of the M5S. The proposal estab-
lishes a minimum hourly wage 
of 9 euros gross, including tax 
contributions and social securi-
ty payments. Available online at 
https://www.senato.it/service/PDF/
PDFServer/DF/339903.pdf. 
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At the same time, the conflict over tax reform re-emerged into the conflict on the budget 
plan and it brought to two incompatible positions. League wanted to introduce tax re-
form. The 15% flat tax, divided into three groups of family income, supported by Salvini, 
did not convince the 5SM, nor the Economy Minister, who instead put forward the (less 
expensive) hypothesis of the reduction of the personal income tax rates. According to the 
5SM, it should also be accompanied by the expansion of the no tax area and the intro-
duction of the family coefficient (Pogliotti and Rogari, 2019). Instead, Di Maio proposed 
that the budget plan should introduce the legal minimum wage, which was opposed by 
the League. Despite their differences, at the same time a possible agreement on the mi-
nimum wage was identified: an intervention on the tax wedge to sterilize the burdens on 
companies due to the introduction of the minimum wage, which must however comply 
with EU regulations. In addition, the 9 euros per hour could include wages, such as the 
‘thirteenth paycheck’ and the severance pay (Mobili and Tucci, 2019). However, with res-
pect to this issue, companies and unions have always expressed their opposition. On the 
one hand, due to the risk of increases in the cost of labor for companies and, on the other 
hand, due to possible negative effects with respect to national collective bargaining con-
tracts that offer greater protections, not only of a remunerative nature.
Then, in July, the case of the alleged Russian funding of Salvini’s party exploded. Objec-
tively, it was a reason for the leader weakening, as he demonstrated how he was no lon-
ger able to threaten a crisis, given the uncertainty of the results of a judicial investiga-
tion. This judicial initiative also exposed him to a tough confrontation with the premier, 
who decided to report to parliament distinguishing his behavior from that of the North 
League vice premier (Palmerini, 2019c).  Meanwhile, the League had to decide how to 
vote with respect to the new EU Commission and Ursula von der Leyen’s candidacy for 
the presidency of the European body. The European parliamentarians of the 5SM voted 
in favor, together with those of the Democratic Party and Forza Italia. On the contrary, 
the League parliamentarians voted against, as did the parliamentarians of Fratelli d’Ita-
lia. The 5SM votes were decisive for the appointment of Ursula von der Leyen (Pelosi, 
2019). The difficulties in the sharing of power between the two political parties became 
more and more frequent. The Brussels vote will be destined to have great influence over 
future differences. It marked the first major misalignment between the two parties in 
their orientation towards the EU. 
The table 2 summarizes the divergences between the two parties of government respect 
of selected issues.
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Tab. 2 – Issues: League and 5SM policy positions
League 5SM
Public debt/deficit EU










Objections to EU target
Vote against Von der Leyen
Flat tax rate at 15%
Closed ports and expulsion of illegal 
immigrants
Reduction labor cost
Pro status quo for fixed-term contracts
Exit flexibility Number of 100 
(age=62 contribution=38)
Starting income from work which is a loan
Regionalization of the school
Fixed participation in national taxes
Pro HST
Objections to EU target
Vote for Von der Leyen
Reduction income tax rates
Ambiguous position
Right to a minimum wage
More restrictions
Exit flexibility Number of 100 
(age=59 contribution=41) 
Citizenship income
Against Regionalization of the school
Equalization fund between the regions
Halt HST
There are therefore many reasons of a government crisis on the initiative of the League, 
despite the inadequacy of the electoral calendar. Anyway, the ultimate conflict was bound 
to be budget law. Salvini declared that the flat tax should be enacted, but the 5SM refused 
that measure; instead, Di Maio proposed to implement a fiscal reform with three tax rates 
(to favor medium-low incomes) and the minimum wage law. The agreement was not rea-
ched and the government crisis was declared by Salvini on August 8th, 2019.
The Italian case: 
What changed?
Whether or not the emergence of a moderate, centripetal and bipolar political system, 
which first emerged in the mid-1990’s, has moved into a new phase of polarization along 
the right/left axis, is the second issue (see the Introduction) examined in the study of the 
Italian case. The second hypothesis analyzes the effects that the placement (extreme and 
opposite on the left-right axis) of the two political forces (5SM and League) has had on 
the structure of party competition. It allows to address the logic behind the formation 
of the yellow-green government, and to identify which theory of government coalitions 





In order to tackle the second issue, the study will review the main evidences available 
from the political science literature on the Italian party system, albeit briefly. Although 
a simplification, it is possible to distinguish two phases in the evolution of the party 
system after World War II. The first phase (often referred to as the first republic) took 
place between 1945 and 1992 and accompanied the consolidation process of Italian de-
mocracy. The second phase, the so-called second republic, began in 1994, after the defeat 
of the traditional party system, in place between 1992 and 1993. In the 2013 and 2018 
elections, a new important party appears on the political scene: the Five Star Movement. 
After the 2018 elections, this party will govern together with the League from June 2018 
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until August 2019. The 5SM will be the first party of the government coalition led by the 
prime minister Giuseppe Conte.
The First Republic
Since 1948, the highly structured party system has been fundamental for the consolida-
tion of Italian democracy (Morlino, 2003). Parties had established themselves together 
with strong social and political divisions, and a proportional electoral law with a very 
low representation threshold. These features allowed the development of a large num-
ber of parties, within an extreme and polarized multi-party system. During the second 
post-war period, these political parties (especially the mass parties) went through ideo-
logical, programmatic, strategic and organizational changes, while overall party organi-
zation survived, albeit with different structural models. The Christian Democrats (CD), 
the Italian Communist Party (ICP) and the Italian Socialist Party (ISP) were the largest 
and most popular parties, while medium and small parties with different ideological 
orientations, such as the Republicans (IRP), the Liberals (ILP), and the Radicals (RP) 
emerged. These smaller parties were opinion parties, and were capable of gathering 
votes on specific issues. The Social Democrats Party (ISDP) was considered a hybrid 
between a mass and opinion party, while the Social Movement (ISM) was structured 
according to the classic mass party model. Thus, the multiparty system was centrifu-
gal, with a strong center represented by the relative majority party (the CD) capable 
of giving life to governments with the support of small parties, which were significant 
because of their coalitional potential (ILP, IRP, ISDP and ISP); then, there was an ascen-
ding left (the ICP) and a reduced right (the Italian Social Movement). Since in the ear-
ly 1980’s, different sections of a new political movement (League) have emerged in the 
North of Italy and, in 1990, its leader Umberto Bossi has unified them in a single party: 
North League. Their electoral success first came in the 1990 local elections and then with 
the 1992 national elections (Ignazi, 1997). 
The absence of governmental centralization characterized parliamentarism of the first 
republic: parliament maintained its autonomy from the executive, and the executive 
from his president (Fabbrini, 1994). For a long period of the republic’s history, parlia-
ment represented an arena for the accommodation of the elites of the various parties, 
constituting the privileged seat for a pragmatic search for agreements between the gov-
ernment and the opposition parties (the ICP) (Di Palma, 1978). In the absence of a bipo-
lar system, the selection of the prime minister was never bound by the elections results. 
The government majority was the result of constant post-electoral bargaining and the 
choice of the prime minister always went to the one who would have ensured the agree-
ment between the parties (almost never a party leader), which operated in a very con-
strained context precisely because it was not homogeneous. Precisely for this purpose, 
the prime minister, more than conducting and guiding the general policy of the govern-
ment, has always played a mediating role between the various actors of the government, 
and the government coalition has been interpreted as the projection of the leadership of 
the coalition parties19. Italy has experienced a disconnected, multiple direction, that is a pro-
liferation of governmental sub-structures, each endowed with its own decision-making 
autonomy, demonstrating the weakness of the government as a collective actor (Calise, 
1987; Cotta, 1987; Cotta and Isernia, 1996).
19. For an analysis of the turnover 
rates of members of parliament 
and members of the government, 
the contents of the government 
programs and the language used in 
the policy speeches by the executi-
ves of the so-called first republic, see 
Villone and Zuliani (1994).
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The Second Republic
The political system underwent a change between 1992 and 1993, as a result of the se-
rious crisis which, after 1989, affected Italy. The two causes were the collapse of com-
munism in Eastern Europe (1989-1990) and the explosion of the judicial investigations 
against political corruption (1992-1993). The first external event led to a change in the 
international balances that had contributed to the shaping of the Italian institutional 
and party political framework in the second post-war period and weakened the ideolo-
gical opposition of political competition during the ‘first republic’. On the one hand, we 
witnessed the transformation of the ICP into the Democratic Party of the Left and, on 
the other hand, the loss of the role traditionally played by the Christian Democracy of a 
barrier against communism. For their part, the judicial investigations into political corrup-
tion, revealing the wide boundaries of the degeneration of the relationship between po-
litics and economic interests, caused a rapid and deep delegitimization of the political 
class (Grilli di Cortona, 2007). Faced with party defeat, the so-called technical governments 
(Amato and Ciampi governments) were established between 1992 and 1994, and they 
were characterized by significant changes in the relations between the government and 
the parties and between the prime minister and ministers (Fabbrini, 2000).
The political scenario that emerged from the early elections of 1994 showed the restruc-
turing of a new party system: new players and new competitive rules, as all the tradi-
tional parties of the first republic had by now disappeared or changed. A new winner-
take-all electoral system with proportional correction was put in place: the 3/4 of the 
seats in Parliament were allocated through single-member constituencies and 1/4 of the 
seats through a proportional rule, with a 4% threshold. This system has pushed parties to 
form electoral and governmental coalitions. The 1993 electoral reform led to centripetal 
competition and favored the start of bipolarism (Pappalardo, 2000; Di Virgilio, 2005). It 
involved a change in favor of low or moderate ideological distance between voters and 
relevant parties, absence of a third pole placed in the center, high volatility of votes wi-
thin and between left and right, the possibility of access to power for all political forces, 
and possible alternative government formulas (Sartori, 1976). Thus, the new system had 
abandoned polarization and led to bipolarism, favored by the formation of right and left 
coalitions, and alternative governments (Morlino, 2005). The multiparty system had be-
come limited and moderate, with a centripetal competition between two poles: the radi-
cal right (the North League) and the moderate right (Forza Italia), against the moderate 
left (the Democratic Party of the Left) and the radical left (Communist Refoundation). 
Bipolarism prevailed over two decades, and moderate forces managed to limit the des-
tabilizing pressures of the League and Communist Refoundation (CR). 
Within the second republic, the 2006 elections showed the highest index of bipolarism20. 
On the one hand, Berlusconi’s People of Freedom and, on the other hand Veltroni’s De-
mocratic Party developed a full bipolar competition. Since the 2008 elections, bringing 
out a system that Chiaramonte (2010) defined as limited bipolarism. This represented an 
innovation after the fragmented bipolarism of 1994-2001, characterized by the presence 
of many small parties with the strong power of blackmail on coalitions. However, those 
two electoral alliances of center-right and center-left, with their respective leaderships, 
received a strong challenge by the 5SM, that gained 25,6% of the votes, in the early elec-
tions of 2013. In that circumstance, the Movement completely reduced the bipolar frame 
established since 1994 (Pombeni, 2016:279).
The 2013 elections, with the extraordinary success of the 5SM, led to a change of the 
party system, whose diagnosis is different according to its different classification as 
20. The bipolarism index is the sum 
of the seats (or votes) of the two 
strongest coalitions (Chiaramonte 
and Emanuele, 2014).
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either an above the left/right cleavage, or a radical leftist party. According to the first group 
of scholars, the 5SM is post-ideological and therefore cannot be placed along the right/
left axis. The party system after 2013 would therefore have become tripolar, with the right 
(the Freedom Coalition with Forza Italia and the League), the left (the Democratic Party) 
and the 5SM. The Five Star Movement erased post-1994 bipolarism. Due to its post-ideo-
logical attractiveness, the 5SM became a strong third pole, even in terms of identity. It 
has been observed that the 5SM is not comparable to the other parties, as it isolates itself 
from any traditional ideological identification between right, left or center, managing 
to become a political subject able to represent the country in transversal way without 
any geographical connection (Chiaramonte and Emanuele 2014: 9). The entry into par-
liament of this new political actor hindered the victory of the two coalitions that had 
faced each other for twenty years. Thus, populism won, also because of the apathy and 
the disengagement of the electorate, due to persistent distrust toward politics in recent 
years. The new generations voted for the 5SM, which used the new means of communi-
cation that inevitably entered politics (Cotta and Verzichelli, 2008:262-263). The combi-
nation of these conditions represented a new shock to the Italian party system, charac-
terized by a rate of party innovation, the lowest level of bipolarism in the history of Italy 
and a record for electoral volatility. The electoral success of the Five Star Movement may 
have been favored by several factors: the ideological decline of the parties in the second 
republic, the promotion of governments lacking a direct connection with popular sove-
reignty (the Monti government), the personalization of leadership with parties by the 
weak and light organizational structure, and the financial crisis of 2008.
Many scholars have labeled the Five Star Movement as populist, according to its uni-
tary conception of people, the dichotomy between pure citizens and corrupted (Italian 
and European) elites, the emphasis on direct democracy, the antagonism towards in-
stitutions (Tarchi, 2015; Chiapponi, 2017). However, some authors suggested to distin-
guish the 5SM from other parties, like the League, that have been labeled as populist as 
well. The 5SM is different as it is ecologist, pacifist, participatory; all these features are 
strongly different from those of the so-called populist right (Revelli, 2017). Moreover, the 
League’s conception of people is very nationalist and anti-immigration, while the 5SM 
political objectives and its values are oriented towards common or public goods (Biorcio, 
2015). These two parties share some positions: the critique of ‘strong powers’, establish-
ment and political elites; the protest against the priority towards European Union; the 
defense of lower sectors of the population; the negative evaluation of previous govern-
ments’ performance; the foresight of an uncertain future for the middle and lower class-
es (Biorcio e Natale, 2018:96). Both parties want to favor political change, but their pro-
grams and policies are different (Passarelli e Tuorto, 2018:136). Thus, many scholars have 
emphasized both similarities (in their protests) and differences (in their ideologies and 
programs). The electorate of the two parties shows that the League and the 5SM are voted 
by citizens that are different and not similar: not only according to their socio-demo-
graphic dimensions, but especially for their political preferences. The League’s electors 
are strongly against migration flows and European Union, but are always pro-market in 
economy. The 5SM’s electors are more heterogeneous and diversified in their political 
positions (Passarelli and Tuorto, 2018:142-144). In few years, the 5SM highly increased its 
electoral consensus, deeply influencing electoral competition among parties (Diamanti, 
Bordignon and Ceccarini, 2013; Tronconi, 2018). Few years after its birth in 2009, the 5SM 
reached 25% of votes in the political elections of 2013. Its electoral base has been stabilized 
under both the socio-demographic and the political dimension: after 2013, the 5SM’s elec-
tor was similar to the average Italian elector (Ceccarini e Bordignon, 2014). Instead, until 
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2010-2011, the 5SM’s electorate had some exceptional and specific features. It was mostly 
composed by males; it had a medium-high level of instruction; the average age was below 
45 years; it came from Northern Italy (and especially from the red regions); the ideology of 
its electors was leftist, with a strong participatory vision of politics. After the 2013 elec-
tions (the first national challenge for the 5SM) the average data on age, education level, 
economic conditions have become more heterogeneous, also according to the terri torial 
distribution of its electors. Southern Italian and Isles’ electors increased in 2010-2011 and 
in 2013, while those of the North, and especially of the North-West, decreased. After a 
first period of strong expansion in the North, in 2013 the 5SM became national in all It-
aly and especially in Sicily and Sardinia (Ceccarini and Bordignon, 2015). These trends 
have been recently confirmed (Corbetta, 2017). The 5SM’s electors can be divided into 
three ideological groups. In 2015, 35% of the electors refused the distinction among right, 
left and center. In 2010, 48% of the electors were leftist, while 11% were rightist; in 2012 
rightist electors increased to 28%, and they were nearly one third of the total in 2015  (Ce-
ccarini and Bordignon, 2016). In sum, the empirical researches showed that at beginning 
the 5SM mostly attracted leftist electors, while after 2013 different social sectors, with 
opposite political preferences, and coming from many Italian regions, voted for the Five 
Star Movement (Diamanti, 2014; Ceccarini and Bordignon, 2016; Pedrazzani and Pinto, 
2017). In the 2018 elections, five different groups of the 5SM electors emerged. At the 
beginning, leftist electors (followers and gauchists)21 were 75% of the S5M electorate, but 
they decreased at 45% in 2013 and 30% in 2018. However, leftists are majoritarian among 
the 5SM’s activists and those who vote in the 5SM’s internet platforms. Then, there are 
the rational electors, and those who consider the 5SM as the less worse choice. In 2018, 
these two categories became the 60% of the electorate. Finally, there are the electors that 
have been disappointed by the Democratic Party: in 2018, they represented the 13% of the 
total. Thus, in the most recent elections, leftist electors decreased, while center and right-
ist voters increased, together with those who refuse a precise ideological choice (Biorcio 
and Natale 2018:58-61). In 2018, the League increased three times his votes of 2013, cap-
turing many former Forza Italia’s electors. Sociodemographic data of electors (gender, 
age, education, occupation, religion) confirmed a long-term trend, with few qualitative 
changes (Passarelli and Tuorto, 2018:84). Female voters increased, like the average age of 
electors, which was next to the exit from labor market. The educational level was lower; 
there were more autonomous and private sector (especially of large firms) workers. The 
League’s electors has still an intermediate religious identity level. Then, there also was a 
relevant change in the ideological preferences of the League’s electors. In the 1990s, they 
were close to the center, but in the 2000’s there was a shift towards the right, and in 2018 
this trend continued, pushing electors towards the extreme right. The League’s leaders 
became more radical too. The right-left cleavage is highly legitimated by the League’s 
electors, and only 15,9% of them refuse an ideological choice. The 5SM’s not-ideological 
electors are 39,1%. Many scholars have labeled extreme right, radical left and post-ideo-
logical parties as populist. In 2018, the League’s electors showed to like a plebiscitarian 
relation with their leader, especially in order to push politicians to renovate their role and 
to represent their electors in a better way (2018:97). 
According to Fossati (2020), the 5SM would have simply replaced Communist Refoun-
dation in the ideological space of the radical left. After the failure of socialism in 1989, 
Communist Refoundation gained the votes of the radical electorate in the 1990’s, but 
then declined. That political void was filled by populists, precisely because the expan-
sion of public spending in favor of the poorest sectors of the population represents the 
‘next best thing’ to socialism. In sum, the discourse of the post-ideological nature of the 
21. Followers strongly support direct 
democracy and mobilization by in-
ternet; gauchists are left electors.
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5SM would have been an instrumental way, in order to attract rightist electors, many 
of whom voted for the 5SM. Rightist League and leftist 5SM represented ‘the low’ of the 
electorate (Ostiguy 2017). Those two radical parties mobilized electors against ‘the two 
high’: moderate right (Berlusconi’s Forza Italia) and moderate left (Democratic Party). 
The differences between the low and the high are related with socio-cultural origin of 
the electorate. This is the typology elaborated by Fossati (2020).
















In December 2017, the North League changed its name (becoming the League for Salvi-
ni), while in the 2018 political elections it presented itself as League. Forza Italia’s crisis 
changed the balance within the right, and while in the 90s and 2000s, Bossi’s North 
League was always the weakest member of the right-wing coalition, in the 2010s Salvi-
ni’s League clearly overtook Berlusconi’s party, also taking advantage of the decline of 
its leader. In recent years, the League has increasingly characterized itself as a radical 
(sovereignist and xenophobic) right-wing party. Alleanza Nazionale’s disappearance also 
left a political void on the right, whose leader (Giorgia Meloni) was unable to fill (D’Ali-
monte, 2019b). The League presented We’re with Salvini campaign in the South, in many 
regional elections; then, a single symbol has been exhibited throughout the national te-
rritory in 2018. The North League voters coexist with the League voters in the South, but 
the issue of the differentiated autonomy within Italy has complicated Salvini’s govern-
ment choices (D’Alimonte, 2019b). 
In the 2018 elections, the two most radical parties (on the low) defeated the two moderate 
ones (on ‘the high’). Previous bipolarism failed because of the lack of agreement between 
the two right parties (League and Forza Italia) and between the two left parties (DP and 
5SM), and for the first time, in Italy, a coalition government was formed between the 
two low: the radical right and the radical left. In 2017, a new mixed electoral system was 
introduced22. It allocates the 2/3 of the seats of parliament with a proportional formula. 
In the 2018 political elections, the strategies of party competition changed: the new ru-
les have pushed towards a centrifugal polarization, which has replaced the centripetal 
competition. The main parties remained four, but in the 1990’s and in the 2000’s there 
were two ideological political coalitions: radical and moderate left against radical and 
moderate right. In 2018, a sociological coalition was launched, with an alliance between 
radical right and radical left against both moderate left and moderate right. Thus, the 
system had four (and not two or three) poles/parties: from an ideological point of view, 
there was a sort of quadrille, because parties’ strategies were mostly independent from 
the left vs right coalitions’ dynamics, and thus the competition became centrifugal. The 
two radical parties (League and 5SM) had become stronger than the two moderate ones 
(Forza Italia and the DP). In the 1900’s and 2000’s, the opposite precisely happened, and 
22. See the electoral Law, No-
vember 3rd, 2017, Nº 165 (Modifi-
che al sistema di elezione della Ca-
mera dei deputati e del Senato della 
Repubblica. Delega al Governo per 
la determinazione dei collegi eletto-
rali uninominali e plurinominali).
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the completion was centripetal. At the same time, an alliance between moderate right 
and moderate left has not materialized; otherwise, there would have been a tripolar po-
litical system.
The vote of March 4th, 2018 saw the success of the right coalition, with about 37% of the 
votes, but the Five Star Movement was the most voted party with 32% of the votes. The 
electoral turnout (72,93% for the Chamber of Deputies and 72,99% for the Senate) was 
the lowest in the Italian republic’s history. The growth of the 5SM was higher in the Ita-
lian provinces characterized by higher unemployment rates and which are almost all in 
the South. Salvini’s National League became the top right force with 17,5% of the votes, 
strengthening its presence in the North and penetrating the regions of the former red 
zone and the South. Its vote was highest in the provinces where the presence of foreig-
ners is greater. Forza Italia hit a historic low, at 14%, lost the leadership of the right and 
accentuated its decline. Even the defeat of the Democratic Party (at 19%) was clear: it 
lost the South and revealed the disappearance of the center-left, without prejudice to the 
persistence of a moderate electorate distributed among the various parties sensitive to 
credible proposals. For the Five Star Movement the most important factor of success was 
economic precariousness, for the League it was identity fears (D’Alimonte, 2018).
The government agreement between the 5SM led by Di Maio and Salvini’s League, which 
resulted in the establishment of the yellow-green government on June 1st, 2018, was not 
an agreement between two populist parties. It was a pact between two different radical 
(the xenophobic/sovereignist League and the populist 5SM) parties, with very different 
values and beliefs, which represent different constituencies and interests and therefore 
have different objectives. 
Birth, life, and end 






The empirical analysis presented in the previous paragraphs confirmed the decision 
to place Salvini’s League on the right and the 5SM on the left of the democratic politi-
cal-party spectrum. The 5SM has increasingly developed its Manichean left-wing popu-
list ideology, with a strong orientation towards increasing public spending to benefit 
the poorest sectors of the population. The League has turned into a radical right-wing 
xenophobic party, such as the Fidesz party of Orban in Hungary, which has put the fight 
against immigration first, to strengthen its sovereignist ideology (also in conflict with 
the EU). At the same time, there was the electoral weakening of moderate parties: DP on 
the left and Forza Italia on the right.
The birth of the yellow-green government in June 2018, chaired by Giuseppe Conte, na-
turally denied the ideological hypothesis in the coalition building, which should have led 
to either a right wing (between the League and Forza Italia) or a leftist (between DP and 
5SM) government. The former did not have the numbers, while the latter was made diffi-
cult by the fact that the 5SM had based its electoral campaign on an anti-Renzi and an-
ti-DP stance. The two parties were therefore neither ideologically, nor programmatically 
compatible. Therefore, the government was born following the cost/benefit calculation 
made by the leaders of the two parties: the yellow-green coalition was the most effective 
example of the so-called minimum winning coalition, based on the minimum number of 
parliamentarians or parties needed to reach a parliamentary majority. This hypothesis 
derives from the rational theory of political behavior. It postulates, as the main purpose 
of political-party action, the acquisition of government offices, and therefore deduces 
that the behavior of political actors is oriented to minimize the size of the government 
coalition, in order to reduce the coefficient based on to whom assign the offices (Riker 
1962). Directed by prime minister Conte, it seems to be a strategic alliance, based on 
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an exchange of votes necessary to always reach a majority, in the presence of a double 
delegation (e.g. the 5SM is silent on the security decree and the League is silent on the 
citizenship income) more important given the absence of shared public policies. The 
exchange allows a low profile on the abstention votes and maximum visibility on the 
victories and, in the absence of sanctions imposed by the EU or by the financial markets, 
the alliance was quite stable, even if always on the verge of breaking. The coalition attri-
tion began immediately after the launch of the government, increased with the electoral 
victories reported by League during the municipal, regional and finally European elec-
tions, until reaching the maximum intensity in July 2019.
The crisis led to the fall of the government for ideological reasons, and not electoral, 
given the definitive closure of the September electoral window, which should have spu-
rred the crisis to begin at least by July; however, this did not happen. Therefore, assu-
ming that the aim of the actors of a government coalition is (in addition to optimizing 
the conquest of government positions) to achieve its policy objectives, the dissolution 
of the government was the payback of the ideological hypothesis against the winning 
minimum coalition. In fact, the acquisition and maintenance of public offices are not 
the only one purpose of political parties. They are also oriented to increase, or at least to 
maintain, the support of the voters and that of their militants and followers, precisely 
through the achievement of the promised policy objectives. The process that will lead to 
the decomposition of the majority is therefore the impossibility of building a compro-
mise between diametrically opposed options on fiscal policy for the year 2020. This con-
flict, which affects the ideological and programmatic identity of the Northern League, 
has added to other conflicts, less divisive though important.
     In any case, we will see if in the future the coalition between radical left (5SM) and mo-
derate (DP) left will resist the impact of the next challenges (not only the electoral ones). 
If the growth of the two radical poles (the League on the right and the 5SM on the left) 
will be confirmed in the next elections, and if, at the same time, it will not be possible to 
form a government of either the two rights or the two lefts, the two possible outcomes 
will be the rebirth of the yellow-green coalition, or the transition to an ungovernable 
phase of the Italian political system.
At last, what can we learn about populism? There are both moderate and radical popu-
lisms (Fossati 2020). The most relevant empirical evidence of this case study is that Ita-
lian radical populist policies have strongly been obstructed by the EU. The most intense 
conflict has been with the EU. For two consecutive years, when the budget law had to 
be approved in parliament, the government’s expenditure programmes forced the EU 
to envisage the opening of a debt infringement procedure against Italy. In both cases, 
thanks to the persuasive capacity of the domestic and european institutions, and the 
alarm of the financial markets, conflict with Europe found a settlement. M5S and Lega 
reduced deficit claims and sanctions to Italy were suspended. It is possible to argue that 
in Europe, given the EU constraints, radical populism (like, for example, in Venezuela 
with Chavez and Maduro) is unlikely to develop.
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